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Figure 4: Rule Schedule Approach for Role Assignment
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Figure 5: Role Schedule Approach for Role Assignment
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Figure 6: Rule Schedule Approach for Role Hierarchy
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Figure 7: Role Schedule Approach for Role Hierarchy
31uration is unsafe for a given generic right. However, it is undecidable whether a given
conﬁguration of a given protection system is safe for a given generic right. Jones et
al. [16] state that the safety analysis of whether a user will gain an access right can be
answered in linear time (for a speciﬁc class of simple policies). Sandhu [26] proposes
the Schematic Protection Model (SPM) that has a high expressive power and provides
an analysis which is both decidable and tractable only if the model is acyclic and at-
tenuating. Ammann et al. [3] propose ESPM to address the limitations of SPM. In
fact, the main outcome of the paper is that, it proves that ESPM is equivalent to HRU.
The beneﬁts of having strong typing in the access control schemes as depicted in SPM
model can also be embedded into the basic HRU model. Sandhu [27] proposes Typed
Access Matrix (TAM) model to address this issue and shows that HRU is a special case
of TAM. Soshi [29] provides an extension of TAM, called Dynamic TAM (DTAM), in
which changes in object types are allowed and allowing a non monotonic scheme and
removing the restriction of strong typing can also provide a decidable safety analysis
under certain conditions.
For RBAC, there are some studies exploring the security analysis. Li and Tripuni-
tara [21, 22] develop the ﬁrst approach to security analysis in RBAC. Jha et al. [15]
state that the security analysis problem on URA with a simple query of whether a user
is a member of a particular role is PSPACE-Complete. Stoller et al. [30] consider ana-
lyzingthe securityproblemin a parameterizedcomplexityenvironment. The algorithm
provided for analysis is said to be ﬁxed parameter tractable with respect to the number
of roles. Ferrara et al. [12] proposes a set and numerical abstraction based reduction
of ARBAC97 policies into programs, so that a program veriﬁcation tool can be used
to check the security properties. According to the results they obtain, the model scales
well to analyze security properties of large ARBAC policies.
The ﬁrst model that embeds temporal data to access control is proposed by Bertino
et al. [7] and called the Temporal Authorization Model (TAM). The model is basi-
cally built on the Discretionary Access Control model using discrete time. Atluri and
Gal [4] propose another model that embeds the temporal notion into access control.
The ﬁrst temporal model developed on RBAC – Temporal RBAC – is proposed by
Bertino et al. [8] that has periodic role enabling and role triggers. Joshi et al. [20]
propose Generalized Temporal RBAC model which considers Temporal constraints on
role assignments, role activations, enabling and disabling constraints (like cardinality
constraints), and temporal role hierarchies and SOD constraints in addition to Tempo-
ral RBAC. Mondal et al. [23] provide a security analysis for Generalized Temporal
RBAC using timed automata to verify the safety and liveness security properties. This
real time veriﬁcation process is PSPACE-Complete. The important observation is that
the veriﬁcation process has a state space explosion for large number of users.
The work in this paper builds upon our prior work in [31, 32]. [31] provides an
analysis for Temporal RBAC model that considers only time based decomposition for
user to role assignment and role enabling relations. [32] introduces the problem of
security analysis for Dynamic Temporal Role Hierarchies. In this paper, we present
a comprehensive approach that takes all the components of TRBAC into account and
experimentally validate it with real data sets.
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